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ABSTRACT
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have surged in popular-
ity over the last decade. Although Bitcoin does not claim to
provide anonymity for its users, it enjoys a public percep-
tion of being a ‘privacy-preserving’ financial system. In real-
ity, cryptocurrencies publish users’ entire transaction histo-
ries in plaintext, albeit under a pseudonym; this is required
for transaction validation. Therefore, if a user’s pseudonym
can be linked to their human identity, the privacy fallout
can be significant. Recently, researchers have demonstrated
deanonymization attacks that exploit weaknesses in the Bit-
coin network’s peer-to-peer (P2P) networking protocols. In
particular, the P2P network currently forwards content in a
structured way that allows observers to deanonymize users.
In this work, we redesign the P2P network from first princi-
ples with the goal of providing strong, provable anonymity
guarantees. We propose a simple networking policy called
Dandelion, which achieves nearly-optimal anonymity guar-
antees at minimal cost to the network’s utility. We also
provide a practical implementation of Dandelion for de-
ployment.
1. INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrencies are digital currencies that provide cryp-
tographic verification of transactions. Bitcoin is the best-
known example of a cryptocurrency [34]. In recent years,
cryptocurrencies have transitioned from an academic research
topic to a multi-billion dollar industry [13].
Cryptocurrencies exhibit two key properties: egalitarian-
ism and transparency. In this context, egalitarianism means
that no single party wields disproportionate power over the
network’s operation. This diffusion of power is achieved by
asking other network nodes (e.g., other Bitcoin users) to
validate transactions, instead of the traditional method of
using a centralized authority for this purpose. Moreover, all
transactions and communications are managed over a fully-
distributed, peer-to-peer (P2P) network.
Cryptocurrencies are transparent in the sense that all trans-
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actions are verified and recorded with cryptographic integrity
guarantees; this prevents fraudulent activity like double-
spending of money. Transparency is achieved through a
combination of clever cryptographic protocols and the pub-
lication of transactions in a ledger known as a blockchain.
This blockchain serves as a public record of every financial
transaction in the network.
A property that Bitcoin does not provide is anonymity.
Each user is identified in the network by a public, crypto-
graphic key. If one were to link such a key to its owner’s
human identity, the owner’s entire financial history could be
learned from the public blockchain. In practice, it is pos-
sible to link public keys to identities through a number of
channels, including the very networking protocols on which
Bitcoin is built [7]. This is a massive privacy violation, and
can be downright dangerous for deanonymized users.
Bitcoin is often associated with anonymity or privacy in
the public eye, despite explicit statements to the contrary
in the original Bitcoin paper [34]. People may therefore use
Bitcoin without considering the potential privacy repercus-
sions [2]. Moreover, this problem is not unique to Bitcoin;
many spinoff cryptocurrencies (known as altcoins) use sim-
ilar technologies, and therefore suffer from the same lack of
anonymity in their P2P networks.
The objective of this paper is to redesign the Bitcoin
networking stack from first principles to prevent network-
facilitated deanonymization of users. Critically, this redesign
must not reduce the network’s reliability or performance.
Although the networking stack is only one avenue for deanonymiza-
tion attacks, it is an avenue that is powerful, poorly-understood,
and often-ignored. To better convey the problem, we begin
with a brief primer on Bitcoin and its networking stack.
1.1 Bitcoin Primer
Bitcoin represents each user and each unit of Bitcoin cur-
rency by a public-private key pair. A user “possesses” a coin
by knowing its private key. Any time a user Alice wishes to
transfer her coin m to Bob, she generates a signed transac-
tion message, which states that Alice (denoted by her pub-
lic key) transmitted m (denoted by its public key) to Bob
(denoted by his public key). This transaction message is
broadcast to all active Bitcoin nodes, at which point min-
ers, or nodes who choose to help validate transactions, race
to append the transaction to a global ledger known as the
blockchain. Specifically, each miner aggregates a group of
transaction messages into a block, or list, and then com-
pletes a computational proof-of-work for the block; the first
miner to complete a proof-of-work appends their block to
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the blockchain and reaps a reward of newly-minted bitcoins
and transaction fees.
1.1.1 Bitcoin message propagation
This paper focuses on one key step in the pipeline: broad-
casting transactions to other nodes. The broadcasting pro-
cess is critical because it affects which nodes can reap a
transaction’s mining reward (by virtue of the delivery delays
to different nodes), and it also affects the global consistency
of the network (e.g., if only a subset of the users receive a
given transaction).
To understand the mechanics of broadcasting, note that
cryptocurrencies can be abstracted into two layers: the ap-
plication layer and the network layer. The application layer
handles tasks like transaction management, blockchain pro-
cessing, and mining. Nodes are identified by their public
keys in the application layer. The network layer handles
communication between nodes, which occurs over a P2P net-
work of inter-node TCP connections. In the network layer,
nodes are identified by their IP addresses. As we shall see
momentarily, a node’s IP address and public key should re-
main unlinkable for privacy reasons.
Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer broadcast of transactions and blocks
is based on flooding information along links in the P2P net-
work. When a node learns of a new transaction or block,
it passes the message to its neighbors who have not yet
seen the message with an independent, exponential delay.
The process continues recursively until all reachable peers
receive the message. This broadcast protocol is commonly
known as a diffusion process; it forms the basis of Bitcoin’s
global, eventually consistent log and is therefore of utmost
importance to its correct and fair operation.
1.1.2 Desirable Network Properties
Bitcoin’s network layer should exhibit two principal prop-
erties: low latency and anonymity.
Low latency means that the maximum time for a message
to reach all network nodes should be bounded and small.
Latency matters because if the network fails to deliver mes-
sages within a predictable time bound, the network risks
reaching an inconsistent state.
Anonymity means that the adversary should be unable to
link transaction messages (and hence, the associated public
keys) to the IP address that originated a transaction. Re-
call that every transaction made by a public key is listed
in plaintext in the blockchain. Therefore, if a public key
can be linked to an IP address, the adversary can link all
of that user’s transactions. In some cases, the IP address
could even be used to learn a node operator’s human iden-
tity. Thus, deanonymization attacks can result in a user’s
entire banking history being revealed. Cryptocurrency users
are typically recommended to choose fresh public keys and
“mix” their coins with others to obscure their transaction
history [43, 11] (in practice, few users do so [27, 31]). How-
ever, these techniques are useless if the IP address of the
source of the transaction can be recovered.
1.1.3 How the Current Network Fails
In recent years, security researchers have demonstrated
multiple deanonymization attacks on the Bitcoin P2P net-
work. These attacks typically use a “supernode” that con-
nects to active Bitcoin nodes and listens to the transac-
tion traffic relayed by honest nodes [28, 7, 8]. Because
nodes diffuse transactions symmetrically over the network,
researchers were able to link Bitcoin users’ public keys to
their IP addresses with an accuracy of up to 30% [7]. More-
over, the source estimators used in these papers are simple,
and exploit only minimal knowledge of the P2P graph struc-
ture and the structured randomness of diffusion. We hypoth-
esize that even higher accuracies may be possible with more
sophisticated estimation tools.
These attacks demonstrate that Bitcoin’s networking stack
is inadequate for protecting users’ anonymity. Moreover,
the Bitcoin networking codebase is copied almost directly in
other cryptocurrencies, so the problem pervades the ecosys-
tem. To some extent, this is to be expected: Bitcoin’s net-
working stack was taken directly from Satoshi Nakamoto’s
original network implementation, which appears to have been
a product of expediency. However, in the decade since Bit-
coin’s release, the networking stack and its anonymity prop-
erties have not been systematically studied.
1.2 Problem Statement and Contributions
We aim to address the Bitcoin P2P network’s poor anonymity
properties through a ground-up redesign of the networking
stack. We seek a network management policy that exhibits
two properties: (a) strong anonymity against an adversarial
group of colluding nodes (which are a fraction p of the total
network size), and (b) low broadcasting latency. We define
these notions formally in Section 2. Critically, these net-
working protocols should be lightweight and provide statisti-
cal anonymity guarantees against computationally-unbounded
adversaries. Lightweight statistical solutions are comple-
mentary to cryptographic solutions, which aim to provide
worst-case anonymity guarantees, usually in the face of com-
putationally bounded adversaries. Lightweight anonymiza-
tion methods lower the barrier to adoption since a more ef-
ficient, faster protocol leads to a better user experience and
also places less burden on developers to significantly mod-
ify existing code; their study is also of basic scientific and
engineering interest. Such is the goal of this paper.
Part of the novelty of our work is that the Bitcoin P2P
networking stack has not been modeled in any detailed way
(much less analyzed theoretically), to the best of our knowl-
edge. In addition to modeling this complex, real-world net-
working system, our contributions are threefold:
(1) Fundamental anonymity bounds. The act of user
deanonymization can be thought of as classifying transac-
tions to source nodes. Precision and recall are natural per-
formance metrics. Recall is simply the probability of de-
tection, a common anonymity metric that captures com-
pleteness of the estimator, whereas precision captures the
exactness. We define these terms precisely in Section 2.4.
Given a networking protocol, the adversary has a region
of feasible (recall, precision) operating points, which are
achieved by varying the source classification algorithm. We
give fundamental bounds on the best precision and recall
achieved by the adversary for any networking protocol, as
illustrated in Figure 1; here p refers to the ratio of collud-
ing nodes to the total number of nodes in the network. We
show that a (recall, precision) point is feasible only if it lies
between the red and blue lines in Figure 1. Moreover, every
networking protocol yields an achievable (recall, precision)
region to the adversary that intersects with the shaded re-
gion (a) in Figure 1 in at least one point.
(2) Optimal algorithm. We propose a simple network-
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Figure 1: Bounds on the precision and recall of any net-
working protocol, plotted for p = 0.2. Dandelion has
strong anonymity properties, achieving a precision-recall re-
gion close to the fundamental lower bounds.
ing protocol called Dandelion, whose achievable precision-
recall region is nearly optimal, in the sense that it is con-
tained in the achievable region of (nearly) every other pos-
sible networking protocol.
Dandelion consists of two phases. In the first phase,
each transaction is propagated on a random line; that is,
each relay passes the message to exactly one (random) node
for a random number of hops. In the second phase, the mes-
sage is broadcast as fast as possible using diffusion. Dan-
delion has two key constraints: (a) in the first phase, all
transactions from all sources should propagate over the same
line, and (b) the adversary should not be able to learn the
structure of the line beyond the adversarial nodes’ immedi-
ate neighbors.
The point labeled ‘Dandelion’ in Figure 1 is the Pareto
frontier of Dandelion’s achievable precision-recall region.
We compare this to the achievable region for diffusion. The
point labeled ‘Diffusion’ was obtained by simulating a dif-
fusion process on a snapshot of the Bitcoin server network
from 2015 [32], and using a suboptimal source classifier. Be-
cause of this, the achievable region must contain the plotted
point, but may be larger. Not only is the region for diffu-
sion a superset of the one for Dandelion, but Dandelion’s
region is nearly as small as possible. We revisit Figure 1 in
greater detail in Sections 3 and 5.
(3) Practical implementation. We outline the practi-
cal challenges associated with implementing Dandelion. In
particular, constructing the graph for Dandelion in a dis-
tributed fashion, and enforcing the assumption that the ad-
versary cannot learn the graph, are nontrivial. We therefore
propose simple heuristics for addressing these challenges in
practical implementations.
Paper Structure. We begin by discussing Bitcoin’s P2P
networking stack and our problem of interest, which we
model in Section 2. We then present fundamental bounds on
our anonymity metric in Section 3; these bounds are used for
comparison with various networking policies later in the pa-
per. In Section 4, we present some first-order solutions, and
explain why they do not work. We present our main result,
Dandelion, in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the systems
challenges of implementing Dandelion, and proposes some
simple, heuristic solutions. We discuss the relation between
Dandelionand prior related work in Section 7, and conclude
with some open problems in Section 8.
2. SYSTEMMODEL
We model three critical aspects of Bitcoin’s P2P network:
the network topology, the message propagation protocol,
and the deanonymizing adversary’s capabilities. These mod-
els are based on existing protocols and observed behavior.
2.1 P2P Network Model
The Bitcoin P2P network contains two classes of nodes:
servers and clients. Clients are nodes that do not accept in-
coming TCP connections (e.g., nodes behind NAT), whereas
servers do accept incoming connections. We focus in this
work on servers because (a) they are more permanent in the
network, and (b) it is straightforward to generalize server-
oriented anonymity solutions to also protect clients.
We model the P2P network as a graph G(V,E), where
V is the set of all server nodes and E is the set of edges,
or connections, between them. For a node v, Γ(v) denotes
the set of v’s neighbors in G. Similarly for a set of nodes U ,
Γ(U) denotes the set of all neighborhood sets of the nodes in
U . To model the graph’s topology, we first discuss Bitcoin’s
network management protocols.
Each node in the Bitcoin P2P network has an address
manager—a list of other nodes’ contact information repre-
sented as a (IP address, port) pair, along with a time es-
timate of when that node was last active. When a server
first joins the network, its address manager is empty, but
the node can learn a random set of active addresses by con-
tacting a hard-coded DNS server. During normal network
operation, nodes periodically relay entries from their address
managers, which helps spread information regarding active
peers. We model address managers by assuming that each
node possesses the contact information for every other Bit-
coin server. In practice, address managers actually contain
a random sample of population IP addresses.
Each server is allowed to establish up to eight outgoing
connections to nodes in the server’s address manager. An
outgoing connection from Alice to Bob is one that is initi-
ated by Alice. However, these TCP connections are bidirec-
tional once established. We therefore model the subgraph of
server-to-server connections as a random 16-regular graph.
In practice, the degree distribution is not quite uniform—we
revisit this issue in Section 6.
2.2 Transaction Model
As explained in Section 2.3, the network is partitioned
into honest nodes and colluding, adversarial nodes, who at-
tempt to deanonymize users. In this work, we assume that
all honest nodes generate one transaction in the time pe-
riod of interest. In practice, servers generate transactions
at different rates; however, all transactions by a single node
are identified by the node’s public key (as long as the node
does not generate fresh keys). Therefore, we treat multiple
transactions from the same node as a single transaction to
be deanonymized. We also assume the exact time when each
server starts broadcasting its transaction is unknown to the
adversary. A typical transaction can take up to 60 seconds
to propagate through the Bitcoin network [16], so estimat-
ing its time of origin at a useful granularity of a second or
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sub-second can be difficult. X is the set of all transaction
messages from honest servers. Xv is the transaction message
originating from honest server v and X is a vector contain-
ing the ground truth mapping between source nodes v and
transactions Xv. We model the mapping between servers
and transaction messages as being drawn uniformly from
the set of all such mappings.
Spreading Model. Once a Bitcoin transaction is complete,
the source broadcasts the transaction message over the net-
work. The protocol for broadcasting transactions should
ensure low transaction latency, in order to provide network
consistency and fairness.
Bitcoin currently uses a diffusion propagation mechanism
to broadcast transactions, in which each transaction source
or relay passes the transaction to the node’s neighbors with
independent, exponential delays. Once a node has received
a particular transaction, the node does not accept future
relays of the transaction. This diffusion spreading serves as
a baseline for our algorithmic improvements. It has good
latency properties due to its exponential spreading [5].
More generally, in this work, we consider spreading poli-
cies that are symmetric in the neighbor node IDs; that is, a
forwarding node does not use the IP address values (or other
metadata) of its neighbors to influence its forwarding deci-
sions. This holds for diffusion spreading, but we constrain
our proposed solutions to also satisfy the same property.
2.3 Adversarial Model
We consider an adversary whose goal is to deanonymize
users by linking their transactions (and hence, their public
keys) to their IP addresses. In particular, we are interested
in defending against botnets—large sets of malware-infected
hosts that are controlled remotely, often without the host
owners’ knowledge [47]. Botnets are a commonly-studied
adversarial model for various Bitcoin attacks [3], largely be-
cause they are easy to access, cheap, and pervasive in the
Bitcoin network [37]. While botnets can have many uses, we
wish to defend against a botnet that aims to deanonymize
users.
We model the botnet adversary as a set of adversarial, col-
luding “spy” nodes that participate in the Bitcoin network
as if they were honest nodes (i.e., honest-but-curious). We
denote honest nodes by VH and adversarial nodes by VA.
For a parameter p, we assume a fixed number of adversarial
nodes (|VA| = np) and honest nodes (n˜ = |VH | = (1− p)n).
The adversarial nodes are dispersed uniformly at random
in the network; this reflects the botnet’s ability to obtain
IP addresses uniformly across the IP address space. How-
ever, for a given topology, the actual locations of the hon-
est/adversarial nodes are random. We further assume that
all nodes know the complete list of active IP addresses, and
honest nodes cannot distinguish between an adversarial and
honest IP address.
Whenever a transaction is broadcast over the network, the
adversarial nodes log the timestamps and the honest neigh-
bors from which they receive the transaction. We assume
a continuous-time system, in which simultaneous transmis-
sions do not occur. For each honest server node v, we let
Sv denote the set of (transaction, receiving spy node, times-
tamp) tuples (x, u, Tu(x)) such that transaction x was for-
warded by honest node v to adversary u ∈ VA at time Tu(x)
(Fig. 9); S is the vector of all Sv’s. We shall see in Section 5
that the honest server who first delivers a given transaction
t=1
t=2|VH | = 7
|VA| = 3
Su = {(Xv, w, 2), . . .} Xvv
u
w
Figure 2: Red nodes are adversarial spies; blue nodes are
honest. Message Xv reaches the spy w at time t = 2.
to the adversary plays a special role.
In addition to the transaction timestamps, the adversaries
can also learn the network structure G, partially or com-
pletely, over time. The extent of such knowledge depends
on the dynamism of the network, and will be made clear in
the context of the specific networks being considered. For
example, if the network is static over an extended period of
time then adversaries can learn the entire graph G. On the
other hand, in a fast changing network, the adversaries have
knowledge of only their local neighborhood Γ(VA). For ease
of exposition, let us, for now, use Γ to denote the adversary’s
knowledge of the graph.
Once the timestamps have been collected, the adversarial
nodes collude to infer the transaction source. The adversary
uses its observations O = (S,Γ) to output a mapping be-
tween transactions and honest servers; we let M(Xv) ∈ VH
denote the server associated with transaction Xv in the ad-
versary’s mapping. This mapping is chosen to maximize the
adversary’s deanonymization payoff, defined in Section 2.4.
2.4 Anonymity Metric
A common metric for measuring a broadcasting scheme’s
anonymity is probability of detection. For a fixed trans-
action and estimator, probability of detection is defined as
PM,G(detection) =
∑
v∈VH P(M(Xv) = v)
n˜
, (1)
or the probability that the estimator outputs the correct
source of a single transaction, computed over all transaction
sources v ∈ VH , mappings between sources and transac-
tions X, realizations of the message propagation trajectory,
and graph realizations G (if the graph is random). While
probability of detection considers a single source, our prob-
lem considers the joint deanonymization of transactions from
distinct sources. In this case, probability of detection inher-
ently captures the recall, or completeness, of an estimator.
We propose to augment this metric by also studying preci-
sion, which captures the exactness of an estimator.
Precision and recall are performance metrics commonly
used in information retrieval for binary classification. Sup-
pose we have n data items, each associated with a class: 0
or 1. We are given a classifier that labels each data item
as either a 0 or a 1, without access to the ground truth.
We designate one of these classes (e.g. class 1) ‘positive’.
For a given classifier output on a single item, a true posi-
tive means the item was correctly assigned to class 1, and a
true negative means the item was correctly assigned to class
0. A false positive means a 0 item was incorrectly classified
as a 1, and a false negative means a 1 item was incorrectly
classified as a 0. If we run this classifier on all n data items,
4
precision and recall are defined as follows:
Precision =
|True Positives|
|True Positives|+ |False Positives|
Recall =
|True Positives|
|True Positives|+ |False Negatives|
where |·| denotes the cardinality of a set, and ‘True Positives’
denotes the set of all data items whose classification output
was a true positive (and so forth).
Precision can be interpreted as the probability that a
randomly-selected item with label 1 is correct, whereas re-
call can be interpreted as the probability that a randomly-
selected data item from class 1 is correctly classified. Adapt-
ing this terminology to our problem, we have a multiclass
classification problem; each server is a class, and each trans-
action is to be classified. For a given server v and mapping
M, the precision DM(v) comparing class v to all other classes
is computed as1
DM(v) =
1{M(Xv) = v}∑
w∈VH 1{M(Xw) = v}
, (2)
and the recall is computed as
RM(v) = 1{M(Xv) = v} (3)
where 1{·} denotes the indicator function. In multiclass
classification settings, precision and recall are often aggre-
gated through macro-averaging, which consists of averaging
precision/recall across classes. This approach is typically
used when the number of items in each class is equal [44], as
in our problem. We therefore average the precision and re-
call over all servers and take expectation, giving an expected
macro-averaged precision of E[DM] = 1n˜
∑
v∈VH E[DM(v)] and
recall of E[RM] = 1n˜
∑
v∈VH E[RM(v)].
We now explain why probability of detection does not cap-
ture the distinction between precision and recall. First, note
that the expected per-node recall is identical to the proba-
bility of detection. Now consider two estimators: in the
first, the adversary’s strategy is to assign all n˜ transactions
to one randomly-selected server v. In the second, the adver-
sary creates a random matching between the n˜ transactions
and honest servers. Both estimators have a probability of
detection (i.e., expected per-node recall) of 1/n˜. However,
the first estimator has an expected per-node precision of
1/n˜2, while the second has an expected per-node precision
of 1/n˜. Operationally, this can be interpreted as a difference
in plausible deniability: the implicated node v in the first
case can deny being the source of any given transaction, be-
cause it could not have generated all n˜ transactions. If a
node is correctly implicated in the second estimator, it has
no plausible deniability. Probability of detection alone does
not capture this difference, and is therefore insufficient as a
standalone metric.
In this work, we quantify anonymity through a combi-
nation of expected macro-averaged precision (or “pre-
cision” for short) and expected macro-averaged recall
(or “recall”, or probability of detection). Higher precision
and recall favor the adversary. For a mapping strategy M
let DM and RM denote the average precision and recall, re-
spectively, obtained in a realization. Our metrics of interest,
1Following convention we define DM(v) = 0 if both the nu-
merator and denominator are 0 in Equation (2).
then, are the overall expected precision DM = E[DM] and re-
call RM = E[RM]. This expectation is taken over four random
variables: the graph realization G (which can be random in
general), the mapping between servers and messages X, the
observed timestamp and topological information O, and the
adversary’s mapping strategy M. Similarly let DM(v) and
DM(v) denote the instantaneous and expected precisions at
a server v ∈ VH , and let RM(v) and RM(v) denote the in-
stantaneous and expected recalls. Let DOPT and ROPT de-
note the precision and recall, respectively, of the precision-
maximizing and recall-maximizing mapping strategies, re-
spectively. The optimal precision is not necessarily achieved
by the same mapping strategy as the optimal recall. The
adversary is computationally unbounded.
2.5 Problem Statement
As network designers, we control two aspects of the net-
work: the graph creation/maintenance strategy and the spread-
ing protocol. Our goal is to choose a graph-selection strategy
and a spreading protocol that simultaneously give low av-
erage latency, precision, and recall guarantees. We restrict
ourselves to the following model of graph generation: For
a fixed topology τ , we assume that the nodes are equally
likely to assume each possible label ordering in τ . Moving
forward, G(V,E) will describe the resulting, labeled graph.
Let T denote the set of all graph topologies over n nodes,
and Σ the set of graph-independent spreading strategies.
The adversary controls only the estimation algorithm for
mapping transactions to nodes. Given a topology τ ∈ T and
a spreading strategy σ ∈ Σ, letMτ,σ denote the set of map-
ping strategies that map n˜ transactions to n˜ servers, with
all knowledge derived from the topology and the spreading
strategy. If τ and σ are clear from context, we simply use
M to denote the space of mapping strategies. We define the
detection region for τ and σ as the set of achievable precision
and recall operating points:
Ω(τ, σ) = {(D,R) | ∃ M ∈Mτ,σ, D = DM, R = RM}.
Note that the detection region always contains the origin.
The adversary’s goal is to find estimators that achieve the
boundary points of the region, whereas our goal is to make
the detection region as small as possible.
Problem: Characterize fundamental, protocol-independent
bounds on the detection region. Further, identify a (τ∗, σ∗)
pair whose detection region is a subset of the detection re-
gion of every graph-generation and spreading strategy:
Ω(τ∗, σ∗) =
⋂
σ∈Σ,τ∈T
Ω(τ, σ). (4)
It is unclear a priori if such a strategy pair exists. In this
work, we show a simple networking policy that closely ap-
proximates condition (4).
3. ANONYMITY METRIC PROPERTIES
Precision and recall are not generally used as anonymity
metrics, since most anonymity systems provide per-user ano-
nymity guarantees [17, 20, 41, 18]. We instead want guaran-
tees against a stronger adversary that jointly deanonymizes
multiple users. The goal of this section is to give intuition
about precision and recall as metrics, and to provide funda-
mental bounds on both.
Our problem differs from traditional classification in that
there is only one data item (transaction) per class (server).
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This restricts the set of achievable macro-averaged precision-
recall points in a somewhat unconventional way. We first
explain how precision and recall are typically used, and then
prove fundamental bounds that illustrate the ways in which
our problem differs from traditional classification problems.
Precision-Recall Curves. Most binary classifiers have an
internal parameter (e.g., a threshold) that can be varied to
give the classifier different precision and recall character-
istics. Sweeping this parameter typically yields a tradeoff
between precision and recall. While this tradeoff has been
studied theoretically [38], it is most often illustrated em-
pirically for a given classifier, through curves like Figure 3
(right). Notably, a classifier can achieve high recall (≈ 1)
at the expense of precision by assigning all data elements to
the positive category, or high precision (≈ 1) at the expense
of recall by classifying only data elements that are clearly
true positives. Hence the precision-recall points (0, 1) and
(1, 0) are typically achievable in practice.
Unlike traditional precision-recall curves, we are not inter-
ested in the curve for a single estimator; we want to identify
the achievable detection region across all estimators. More-
over, since ours is a multi-class classification problem, we
consider macro-averaged precision and recall. With macro-
averaging, increasing the recall (resp. precision) for one class
will often reduce the recall (resp. precision) for another.
Therefore, it is unclear what the precision-recall tradeoff will
look like, or even if the boundary points (0, 1) and (1, 0) are
achievable. The following theorem restricts the set of feasi-
ble, macro-averaged precision-recall points for any estimator
the adversary employs.
Theorem 1. Any mapping policy M ∈Mτ,σ on a network
with topology τ ∈ T and spreading strategy σ ∈ Σ has a
precision and recall that are bounded as
DM
(a)
≤ RM
(b)
≤ √DM. (5)
(Proof in Section A.1.1)
This theorem follows from the definition of macro-averaged
precision and recall; it implies that not only are corner points
(0, 1) and (1, 0) unachievable, but every estimator’s detec-
tion region must lie between the blue and red lines in Fig. 3
(left). Given this constraint, a natural question is whether
there exist precision and recall points that can always be
achieved, regardless of the networking protocol. We demon-
strate the existence of such points by analyzing a simple
estimator.
Lower Bounds. Computing lower bounds on precision and
recall is challenging because the adversary’s knowledge can
vary depending on the networking policy. However, the so-
called first-spy estimator (which is used in practical attacks
like [7]) relies only on the adversary’s knowledge of its lo-
cal network neighborhood. The adversaries we consider will
always have access to this information. The first-spy esti-
mator outputs the first honest node to send a given message
to any of the adversarial nodes. We start by showing that
the first-spy estimator always achieves a precision and recall
of at least p2 and p, respectively, where p is the fraction of
spies. This in turn implies that the maximum precision and
recall over all estimators are individually lower-bounded by
p2 and p, respectively.
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Figure 3: Bounds on the precision-recall detection region for
any networking policy (left). Each bound is labeled with the
corresponding equation number from Section 3. Example of
a typical precision-recall curve (right).
Theorem 2. The optimal precision and recall on a net-
work with a fraction p of adversaries and any spreading pol-
icy are lower bounded as
DOPT ≥ p2 (6)
ROPT ≥ p. (7)
(Proof in Section A.1.2)
This theorem implies that for any networking policy, the
detection region must include at least one point in the shaded
region of Figure 3 (left). Note that if an estimator can
achieve a given (recall, precision) point, then it can also
achieve points with elementwise lower precision and recall
by choosing to discard observed information. The purple
curves labeled (i) and (ii) outline the boundaries of two ex-
amples of feasible detection regions, staggered for visibility.
Optimizing Estimators. Given these constraints on the
detection region, we want to understand what estimators
achieve the maximum precision and recall, respectively. For
a given network specification, precision and recall might be
maximized by different estimators; if this is the case, then
the detection region will have a nontrivial Pareto frontier,
like curve (i) in Figure 3 (left). On the other hand, if the
same estimator maximizes precision and recall, the detection
region’s Pareto frontier will be a single point, like curve (ii).
We start by proving that in order to maximize precision,
the adversary should use a maximum-weight matching es-
timator, where the weights depend on the information ob-
served by the adversary, such as graph structure and times-
tamps.
Theorem 3 (Precision-Optimal Estimator). The
precision-optimizing estimator for an adversary with obser-
vations O = (S,Γ), is achieved by a matching over the
bipartite graph (VH ,X ). Moreover, such a matching is a
maximum-weight matching for edge weights P(Xv = x|O)
on each edge (v, x) ∈ VH ×X of the graph.
(Proof in Section A.1.3)
Theorem 3 gives a corollary used in Section 4 for bounding
the performance of various networking protocols.
Corollary 1. The optimal expected payoff at a server v,
under observations O = (S,Γ) for the adversaries, is upper
bounded as
E[DOPT(v)|O] ≤ max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|O). (8)
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(Proof in Section A.1.4)
Computing the probabilities in Corollary 1 may be chal-
lenging, depending on how much information the adversary
has. Nonetheless, if the adversary can approximate these
probabilities with some accuracy (e.g., if it knows the un-
derlying graph G), there exist polynomial-time algorithms
for computing max-weight matchings [21, 6].
The precision-optimal maximum-weight matching does not
necessarily maximize recall. Notice that for any matching,
its precision and recall are equal, due to the definitions of
precision and recall. The following theorem characterizes a
recall-optimal estimator, which assigns each message x to
any server v for which P(Xv = x|O) is maximized.
Theorem 4 (Recall-Optimal Estimator). The
recall-optimizing estimator for an adversary with observa-
tions O = (S,Γ), is a mapping that assigns each transaction
x ∈ X to any server v∗ ∈ arg maxv∈VH P(Xv = x|O).
(Proof in Section A.1.5)
The first-spy estimator is an instance of a recall-optimal
estimator for spreading models in which the exit node to
the first-spy is the most likely source. Moreover, Theorem 4
implies that a precision-optimal, maximum-weight matching
is only recall-optimal if it also maps each message to its
most likely source, elementwise. For example, if k servers
are equally likely sources for k messages, then the precision-
optimal matching estimator is also recall-optimal.
Summary. This section provides fundamental limits on
both precision and recall, as well as detailing estimators
that optimize precision (Thm 3) and recall (Thm. 4), re-
spectively. These fundamental limits and estimators will be
useful benchmarks as we analyze the precision-recall regions
for networking policies in Sections 4 and 5.
4. BASELINE ALGORITHMS
With the fundamental bounds from Section 3, we now
tackle our main problem: designing a networking policy
with a minimal detection region. A key message of our
work is that statistical anonymity requires mixing of mes-
sages: users should spread their own messages and those of
their peers in a way that is difficult to distinguish. Degree
of mixing depends on three key properties of a networking
policy: (1) the spreading protocol, (2) the topology of the
network, and (3) the dynamicity of the network (i.e., how
often the P2P graph changes). For example, the current Bit-
coin network uses diffusion spreading over a static, roughly
16-regular topology. This policy has poor mixing—i.e., a
large detection region—because different nodes have unique
spreading patterns and can therefore be deanonymized.
In this section, we first identify a taxonomy of networking
policies, based on the properties above. We then system-
atically evaluate the anonymity of various first-order, natu-
ral networking policies from this taxonomy. We show that
most of these baseline policies have poor anonymity guaran-
tees, and we extract rules of thumb for improving a policy’s
anonymity. These rules of thumb will build the groundwork
for our main result, Dandelion, presented in Section 5.
4.1 Taxonomy of Networking Policies
Our taxonomy has three axes: spreading protocol, topol-
ogy, and dynamicity. We consider multiple categories along
each axis.
Spreading protocol. The space of spreading protocols is
vast. In this work, we consider a few natural, first-order
spreading policies, and also propose a new protocol called
dandelion spreading.
Perhaps the most natural spreading strategy is flood-
ing, where messages are propagated with a fixed delay to
all neighbors. A slightly refined version is diffusion, which
adds independent randomness to the transmission delays of
flooding. Diffusion is explained in Section 2.2. Flooding
and diffusion reflect the current status quo in the Bitcoin
network.
Given that our goal is to provide anonymity, another nat-
ural strategy is to forward a message to a randomly-chosen
node, which then runs diffusion or flooding. We call this
spreading protocol diffusion-by-proxy.
Finally, we propose in this paper a new protocol called
dandelion spreading. Dandelion spreading forwards each
message on a randomly-selected line before diffusing it to
the rest of the network. Since dandelion spreading is a com-
paratively new protocol (not a first-order baseline), we defer
a detailed discussion to Section 5.
Topology. We are interested in topologies that are si-
multaneously simple to construct, analyzable, and good for
anonymity. We therefore limit ourselves to a set of canonical
graph models: lines, trees, d-regular graphs, and complete
graphs. These categories are not mutually exclusive; lines
are a special case of both trees and regular graphs (we con-
sider lines and cycles interchangeably), and complete graphs
are a special case of regular graphs.
Dynamicity. Many network-based deanonymization at-
tacks use partial or full knowledge of the connectivity graph
between nodes [45]. We assume that the network can change
the graph at varying rates to control the adversary’s abil-
ity to learn it. We consider two extremes on this spectrum:
static graphs and dynamic graphs. In static graphs, the net-
work never changes the graph, so the adversary learns it fully
over time. In dynamic graphs, the graph is changed at a rate
such that the adversary only knows its local neighborhood
at any given point in time.
In the remainder of this section, we first explore the regions
of our taxonomy by studying three baseline networking poli-
cies: flooding, diffusion, and diffusion-by-proxy. Although
none of these baselines has satisfactory anonymity guaran-
tees, the associated analysis provides valuable intuition that
helps us design better policies in Section 5.
4.2 Flooding
To model flooding, we assume that messages propagate
along each graph edge with a deterministic delay, and nodes
forward incoming messages to their neighbors with a con-
stant delay. On undirected topologies, flooding has poor
source-hiding due to symmetry and the deterministic spread-
ing scheme. However, it is unclear if directed topologies fare
better. We begin by showing that flooding has poor perfor-
mance on directed, static, d-regular graphs.
Proposition 1. The expected precision of flooding on a
static d-regular graph is at least DOPT ≥ (1− (1− p)d) ≥ p.
(Proof in Section A.2.1)
Flooding performs poorly on static regular graphs because
each honest node has a unique spreading “timestamp signa-
ture”, and the adversary can predict these signatures. That
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is, if node v is the source, then the adversarial nodes re-
ceive all messages from v in a deterministic timing pattern.
Moreover, the adversary can predict this pattern from the
structure of the graph, due to the fixed nature of flooding.
This reasoning suggests that if the adversary does not
know the graph, it cannot predict nodes’ spreading pat-
terns, and therefore cannot deanonymize nodes. However,
the following proposition shows that even when the graph is
dynamic, the adversary can achieve a high precision.
Proposition 2. Flooding precision for dynamic d-regular
graphs is bounded as DOPT ≥ cp for some constant c > 0 in-
dependent of p.
(Proof sketch in Section A.2.2)
This result highlights that even if the adversary cannot
predict the exact timestamp pattern for a given node, it can
infer certain statistical properties of the pattern that are suf-
ficient for deanonymization. In short, as long as the topol-
ogy allows messages to flood in more than one direction,
the adversary can use the statistics of observed timestamp
signatures to infer the source of a message.
Lesson: Do not flood content in multiple directions on the
graph at the same rate.
4.3 Diffusion
Diffusion is a natural successor to flooding; instead of us-
ing deterministic delays, it uses random ones. By introduc-
ing uncertainty into the adversary’s timing estimates, dif-
fusion reduces the adversary’s overall precision and recall.
However, much research in recent years has shown that the
source of a diffusion process can nonetheless be identified
reliably [45, 46, 19, 48, 30, 39, 36, 51]. Although there are
no theoretical results on the precision or recall under our
particular adversarial model, several heuristic estimation al-
gorithms are able to identify the source of a diffusion process
on many classes of graphs [36, 51]. Moreover, theoretical re-
sults exist on other adversarial models [45, 46, 48]. All of
these results rely on the intuition that diffusion spreads con-
tent symmetrically. Because of this, the source node appears
at the center of the adversary’s observed spreading pattern,
and can be identified. Diffusion is therefore not a satisfac-
tory solution to this problem.
Lesson: Random forwarding delays are not powerful enough
to provide anonymity against spreading protocols that spread
content symmetrically.
4.4 Diffusion-by-Proxy
The takeaway message from diffusion and flooding is that
symmetry of spreading leads to deanonymization. To counter
this, we must break the symmetry of diffusion. A natural
strategy for breaking symmetry about the source is to ask
someone else to spread the message. That is, for every trans-
action, the source node chooses a peer uniformly at random
from the pool of all nodes. It transmits the message to that
node, who then broadcasts the message. More generally,
the network could forward each message a few hops (each
hop choosing a new node at random) before diffusing it. We
call this approach diffusion-by-proxy, and it is conceptually
equivalent to propagating over a line that changes for every
transmission. Diffusion-by-proxy might seem like it should
have low precision because the graph is so dynamic, but that
intuition turns out to be false.
Proposition 3. The expected first-spy precision of diffusion-
by-proxy is bounded as
DFS ≥ p
1− p (1− e
p−1). (9)
(Proof in Section A.2.3)
Intuitively, this statement holds because each node de-
livers its own message to the adversary with probability p,
and few other nodes report to the adversary over the same
edge. So even though diffusion-by-proxy breaks the symme-
try of diffusion, it also provides many paths for messages to
reach the adversary. Since there are many total paths to the
adversary, each path sees (relatively) less traffic, which in
turn reduces the amount of mixing that happens. A simple
countermeasure is to reduce the number of paths over which
messages can flow.
Lesson: There is anonymity in numbers; dense graphs achieve
poor mixing because they do not constrain messages to flow
over the same paths.
5. MAIN RESULT: DANDELION
The baseline spreading protocols from Section 4 provide us
with a key guideline for building more anonymous network-
ing policies: spread asymmetrically over a sparse graph. In
this vein, we propose a new protocol: dandelion spread-
ing. While the basic intuition of dandelion spreading is used
in several point-to-point anonymous communication systems
[17, 41], it has not been formally studied in the context of
anonymous broadcast messaging.
Algorithm 1: Dandelion Spreading. Nout(G, v) de-
notes the out-neighbors of node v on directed graph G.
Input: Message Xv, source v, anonymity graph G,
spreading graph H, parameter q ∈ (0, 1)
anonPhase ← True
head ← v
recipients ← {v}
while anonPhase do
/* forward message to random node */
target ∼ Unif(Nout(G,head))
recipients ← recipients ∪{Xv} from head to target
head ← target
u ∼ Unif([0, 1])
if u ≤ q then
anonPhase ← False
end
end
/* Run diffusion over H from ‘head’ */
Diffusion(Xv, head, H)
Dandelion spreading consists of an anonymity phase and
a spreading phase (Algorithm 1). In the anonymity phase,
the protocol spreads the message over a randomly-selected
line for a random number of hops; in the spreading phase,
the message is broadcast using diffusion until the whole net-
work receives the message. In general, the two phases can
occur over different graphs. In this work, we will design a
(possibly time-varying) graph G over which the anonymity
phase occurs, and we will assume the spreading phase occurs
over the current Bitcoin P2P network H. The name ‘dande-
lion spreading’ reflects the spreading pattern’s resemblance
to a dandelion seed head (Figure 4).
8
1) Anonymity
Phase
2) Spreading
Phase
Figure 4: Dandelion spreading forwards a message in a line
over the graph, then broadcasts it using diffusion. Here both
phases occur over the same graph, i.e., H = G.
The two-phase nature of dandelion spreading allows us to
separately design networking policies that optimize anonymity
and latency. This separated architecture is not necessarily
optimal in terms of a latency-anonymity tradeoff; explor-
ing that tradeoff is an interesting direction for future work.
However, diffusion is known to have good spreading proper-
ties [5], but poor anonymity properties [45]. Therefore, we
combine it with an anonymity phase of constant duration (in
an order sense), such that the average latency is increased
by a small, bounded factor. We subsequently assume that
the spreading phase can be fully deanonymized; i.e., the
node that launches the diffusion process can be identified.
As such, we only need to analyze the precision and recall
of the anonymity phase. This assumption does not weaken
our anonymity guarantees since it gives the adversary more
power.
A key observation for this analysis is that the anonymity
phase of dandelion spreading largely removes the need for
exact timestamps. For honest server v, let S′v ⊆ Sv denote a
trimmed down version of Sv, in which we retain only those
transaction log tuples (x, u, Tu(x)) that correspond to the
first time transaction x was received by an adversary from
any honest node. That is, we only keep a tuple if u was
the first spy to see message x, and x was delivered to u
by honest exit node v. As before, let S′ denote the vec-
tor of all S′v’s. Then, with dandelion spreading, it holds
that X − (S′,Γ) − S forms a Markov chain. Therefore it
is sufficient to use only the first observation information S′
instead of S for computing transaction likelihoods. In fact,
the sufficient statistic S′ can be further simplified by ignor-
ing the timestamp coordinate Tu(x) in the tuples. This is
possible due to our assumption that the transactions’ origi-
nating times are unknown a priori to the adversary, which
removes the observed timestamps from any temporal refer-
ence frame. Hence, in the remainder of this paper, with a
slight abuse of notation, we use Sv, for honest server v, to
denote the set of message tuples (x, u) such that (i) u was
the first adversarial node to receive x and (ii) u received x
from v. S denotes the vector of Sv’s.
Note that a similar argument does not hold for spreading
mechanisms like flooding or diffusion, in which multiple in-
dependent timestamps across different nodes (i.e., not just
the first observation of a message) are used to compute like-
lihoods. The diversity of such observations allows the es-
timator to compare timestamps across nodes, thus making
them useful for detection.
We begin by showing that the maximum recall for dande-
lion spreading over any connected topology is p, the lower
bound from Theorem 2.
Theorem 5. The expected maximum recall for dandelion
spreading on any connected graph of n nodes with a fraction
p of adversaries is ROPT = p.
(Proof in Section A.3.1)
The reason for this result is that dandelion spreading
propagates content unidirectionally over a line. This lack of
symmetry makes the first-spy estimator—which has a recall
of p—optimal. Theorem 5 result implies that as we explore
various topologies of dandelion spreading, we only need to
analyze and minimize their precision. We do so for three
topologies of the graph G: static trees, dynamic trees, and
dynamic lines. Each topology provides intuition about how
to achieve anonymity. We find that dynamic lines achieve
nearly-optimal average precision and recall.
5.1 Static Trees
Recall that our goal is to mix messages from different
users; in this sense, trees are a natural topology to study.
That is, consider a rooted, directed d-regular tree, with each
edge directed toward the parent node. Dandelion spread-
ing respects the directedness of the graph, so during the
anonymity phase, each node passes all messages to its par-
ent node (i.e. toward the root). Nodes near the root are
therefore able to mix their own messages with exponentially-
many other messages from users beneath them in the tree.
However nodes near the leaves of the tree have few nodes be-
neath them, and therefore experience minimal mixing. This
fundamental asymmetry results in a high average precision.
Proposition 4. The expected precision under a match-
ing estimator MAT on any tree is given by DMAT = p.
(Proof in Section A.3.2)
Intuitively, when the graph is known, the adversary can
partition nodes into wards, or sets of honest nodes that share
the same first spy. Each ward contributes equally to the ad-
versary’s precision, so we would like to minimize the num-
ber of wards. On trees, the expected number of wards is
pn˜, most of which consist of a single leaf with an adversarial
parent node. This gives an overall precision of p.
Although a precision of p is an improvement over Bit-
coin’s current networking policy, we would like to achieve a
precision close to the lower bound of p2 (Theorem 2). We
therefore consider topologies with fewer wards on average.
Lesson: Use topologies in which it is difficult for the adver-
sary to partition nodes into wards.
5.2 Dynamic Trees
The adversary was able to partition the nodes of a static
tree into wards largely because the graph was known. A
natural question is whether dynamic trees have the same
problem, since most of the graph is hidden, except the ad-
versary’s local neighborhood.
A perfect d-ary tree is a rooted tree in which each node has
either d children or no children, and all leaves are at the same
depth. Again, we assume each edge in such a tree is directed
toward the parent node. We find that dandelion spreading
on perfect d-ary trees has an expected precision similar to
that of static trees.
Proposition 5. The expected precision of the first-spy
estimator on a perfect d-ary tree, d ≥ 2, can be bounded
as DFS ≥ p/2.
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(Proof in Section A.3.3)
Since the graph is now dynamic, the adversary cannot
explicitly determine every ward like it could in the static
case. However, the first-spy estimator naturally identifies
wards that consist of a single honest leaf. Statistically, there
are many such wards on trees that are not lines, so we obtain
similar guarantees to the static case. This implies that the
problem with trees is mainly the fact that they have many
leaves.
Lesson: A dynamic graph does not mitigate the negative
impact of leaf nodes.
5.3 Dynamic Lines: Dandelion
Next, we study dynamic line graphs. Lines are 2-regular
trees, but unlike higher degree trees, they do not suffer from
the asymmetry problems associated with leaves. However,
line graphs seem to lack the strong mixing properties of
higher-degree graphs. Nonetheless, we show near-optimal
precision for this class of graphs. This happens because
despite the moderate mixing on lines, the number of hon-
est nodes visible to the adversary is also small. As such,
the adversary cannot accurately partition nodes into wards,
which reduces the overall precision. Note that this would not
hold in the static case, since the adversary could identify the
wards exactly.
Spreading
Protocol
Topology Dynamicity
Static
Dynamic
Dandelion 
spreading
Line
graph
Spreading
Protocol
Topology Dynamicity
Static
Dynamic
Dandelion 
spreading
4-regular
graph
Figure 5: The Dandelion networking policy: (1) dande-
lion spreading, (2) a line topology, (3) a dynamic graph.
We use the name Dandelion to refer to a full network-
ing policy (Figure 5): dandelion spreading over dynamic
lines (i.e., 2-regular graphs with out-degree 1). We begin by
showing that Dandelion has near-optimal precision.
Theorem 6. The expected precision of Dandelion (i.e.,
dandelion spreading on a dynamic line graph) with n nodes
and a fraction p < 1/3 of adversaries, is upper bounded by
DOPT ≤ 2p
2
1− p log
(
2
p
)
+O
(
1
n
)
. (10)
(Proof in Section A.3.4)
This result states that for small p, the expected maximum
precision is within a logarithmic factor of our lower bound
of p2. The stated bound has loose constants for improved
readability; a tighter expression is included in the proof.
The proof depends heavily on the fact that the adversary
cannot reliably assign nodes to wards outside of its local
neighborhood on the graph. As such, it is forced to use
estimators that would give suboptimal precision in the static
case, like variants of the first-spy estimator.
Figure 6 illustrates Dandelion’s detection region com-
pared to those of other benchmark policies. The points for
diffusion and flooding are generated through simulation over
a snapshot of the Bitcoin server graph from 2015 [32]. Since
dandelion spreading has optimally-low recall (Theorem 5),
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Figure 6: Detection regions for studied networking policies,
p = 0.2. Dandelion has a detection region close to the
fundamental lower bounds.
the Pareto frontier for Dandelion is exactly the plotted
point. The other policies are analyzed using possibly-suboptimal
estimators, so their detection regions must at least contain
the plotted points.
Dandelion satisfies the theoretical demands of our prob-
lem. However, implementing Dandelion in a distributed,
robust fashion is nontrivial. In the next section, we dis-
cuss some challenges associated with implementing Dande-
lion and present a simple, distributed implementation with
empirically good performance.
6. SYSTEMS ISSUES
Theoretically, Dandelion is simple and exhibits desirable
anonymity properties. However, the implementation raises
a number of practical considerations, like how to construct
the underlying line graph and how to provide sufficient graph
dynamicity. We discuss each of these challenges, and intro-
duce practical, heuristic solutions for addressing them.
6.1 Constructing a line graph
In Dandelion, all nodes propagate their messages over
the same line. To implement this, the network must build
either a Hamiltonian circuit or a set of long, disjoint lines
in a fully-distributed fashion. Constructing a Hamiltonian
circuit is challenging in our case because it is not a one-time
event; in order to provide dynamicity, the network must fre-
quently construct a new random line. To ensure scalability,
the algorithm for constructing such a line should be fully-
distributed, lightweight, and asynchronous.
Traditional algorithms for computing Hamiltonian circuits
are often computationally intensive and/or require central-
ized control [22, 25], but recent papers have studied lightweight,
distributed alternatives [26, 29]. For instance, [29] first gen-
erates line fragments, then splices them together into a cir-
cuit. However, it relies on the nodes of each line fragment
knowing the identities of the fragment’s head and tail nodes.
This could partially reveal the graph structure to the adver-
sary, which would likely change our anonymity guarantees.
On the other hand, [26] builds up the circuit sequentially;
a pair of nodes start as the circuit ‘seeds’. Each node v
who joins the circuit contacts a random node u from the
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Algorithm 2: k-Approximate Line Approximates a
directed line graph in a fully-distributed fashion. Each
node picks an edge from k options
Input: Set V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} of nodes; parameter k
Output: A connected, directed graph G(V,E) with
average degree 2
for v ← V do
/* pick k random targets */
ui ∼ Unif(V \ {v}), for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
/* pick the smallest in-degree */
u← arg minui degin(ui)
E = E ∪ (v → u) /* make connection */
end
return G(V,E)
partially-built circuit; u replies with the IP address of its
outgoing neighbor w. Then v splices itself into the (u,w)
edge, so the new ordering is u → v → w. This distributed
protocol is a viable solution for constructing an exact line.
Another alternative is to use Bitcoin’s current network-
ing strategy to approximate a line. Currently, each Bitcoin
server generates eight connections at random. We can ap-
proximate a line by asking each server to create one outgo-
ing connection at random. We can further refine this pro-
tocol by having each server, prior to making a connection,
contact k nodes and connect to the node with the smallest
in-degree. Algorithm 2 specifies this algorithm for approx-
imating a line. The protocol is fully distributed, but it is
unclear how well it approximates a line.
Figure 7 illustrates the degree distribution of Algorithm
2’s approximation of a line graph with 1,000 nodes, averaged
over 1,000 trials, for different values of k. First, note that
the average degree is two by construction. As k increases,
the fraction of leaves decays, with the greatest reduction
coming as we transition from k = 1 to k = 2. This empirical
observation is supported by the following proposition:
Proposition 6. Suppose Algorithm 2 is used to construct
a k-approximate line over n nodes. Let the empirical de-
gree distribution of the resulting graph’s nodes have support
(d1, . . . , dm), where d1 < . . . < dm. Then with probabil-
ity 1 − o(1), the maximum degree dm satisfies the following
condition:
dm =
{
logn
log logn
(1 + o(1)) + Θ(1) if k = 1
log logn
log k
(1 + o(1)) + Θ(1) if k > 1.
(Proof in Section A.4.1)
Here we are using maximum degree as a proxy for reg-
ularity (or number of leaves), but recall that the expected
degree is fixed by construction. Therefore, if we can drive
the maximum degree down to 2, the minimum degree must
also be 2. Proposition 6 suggests that we can reap most of
the precision gains of a more regular graph by connecting to
one of k = 2 nodes with minimum in-degree, whereas larger
k only improves the regularity by a factor logarithmic in k.
Sec. 5.2 showed that leaves increase the precision of a
scheme because the leaf nodes’ messages cannot be mixed
with other messages. This suggests that Dandelion can
achieve lower precision over k-approximate lines (Algorithm
2) by increasing k and decreasing the number of leaves. Fig-
ure 8 compares the the first-spy estimator precision for exact
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Figure 7: Degree distribution of k-approximate lines (Algo-
rithm 2) for various k. The fraction of leaves decreases as
the number of edge choices k increases.
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Figure 8: The k edge choices during graph creation (Al-
gorithm 2) do not significantly reduce the precision of the
first-spy estimator beyond k = 1.
lines (generated by [26]) and k-approximate lines (Algorithm
2). The figure shows that over k-approximate lines, average
precision decreases as k increases (i.e., as the distribution be-
comes more regular), but the returns are diminishing in k.
The most significant decrease in precision occurs as we tran-
sition from k = 1 to k = 2; higher values of k give marginal
improvements. Moreover, the precision of k-approximate
lines is significantly larger than that of exact lines, which
could be obtained through the line-creation protocol in [26].
Algorithm 2 and [26] are both viable options for construct-
ing a line. Although [26] has lower overall precision, it uses
more fine-grained information—connection IPs rather than
simple degree information. As such, [26] may be less ro-
bust to misbehaving nodes. Understanding this tradeoff,
and developing alternatives that are resistant to adversarial
misbehavior, are of practical interest.
6.2 Preventing graph leakage
Another challenge associated with Dandelion is that it
assumes the graph G is a line whose structure is unknown
to the adversary. However, lines can be learned over time.
First, note that for any given adversarial node s1 on a 2-
regular digraph, s1 can eventually learn the identities of the
adversarial nodes immediately before and after it on the
graph by sending probe messages. Now consider the fol-
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lowing scenario: a message from an honest user propagates
on the line, and passes s1. At an honest node v between s1
and the next adversarial node s2 (see Figure 9), the message
transitions into the spreading phase at and starts diffusing
over the main P2P graph H. We assume that the adversary
can reliably infer the diffusion source v. Since s2 did not re-
ceive the message before the spreading phase began, and v
was the source of the spreading phase, the adversary learns
that v lies between s1 and s2. In this way, the adversary
learns the internal, honest nodes of G at a rate proportional
to the creation of new transactions; by learning this graph,
the adversary’s expected per-node precision grows to p.
S1 S2v
Figure 9: The adversary can easily learn line graphs.
This problem must be managed by changing the graph
quickly enough that the adversary cannot learn it—i.e., on
the timescale at which transactions are executed. As a
ballpark estimate, the Bitcoin network currently sees about
three transactions per second [10]. Botnets can be rented
through online services; for $200, one can rent a botnet of
1,000 US-based zombies, or corrupted hosts [15]. Since the
current Bitcoin network consists of about 5,500 servers [9],
this corresponds to p ≈ 0.15; each ward would have about
seven nodes on average, of which five are unknown to the
adversary in the fully-dynamic setting. We conservatively
assume that each transaction launches its spreading phase
from a different honest node. If we want to ensure that
the adversary never learns more than 40% of interior nodes,
we should change the graph every 5500 transactions × 5
7
×
0.4× 1 sec
3 transactions
≈ 9 minutes. This is easy to enforce in a
distributed fashion; every nine minutes, each node will tear
down its connections and form new ones. Synchrony be-
tween nodes is not needed for this restructuring due to the
fully-distributed line approximation protocol.
More powerful attackers can create botnets of tens of thou-
sands of nodes, which would overwhelm Dandelion. In such
scenarios, statistical solutions are no longer appropriate.
7. RELATEDWORK
Three key facets of this work appear in the literature:
practical anonymity attacks on Bitcoin, source detection
analysis in diffusion processes, and the design of anonymous
communication protocols.
Anonymity attacks on Bitcoin. There have been several
attacks on the anonymity of Bitcoin, most of which harness
the public nature of the blockchain [40, 35, 42]. Transaction
patterns can be used to link user transactions over time, and
in some cases identify the human owner of a public key.
More recently, authors have demonstrated deanonymiza-
tion attacks on Bitcoin’s networking stack. These attacks
typically use the first-spy estimator, and achieve surpris-
ingly high accuracies [28, 7, 8]. The Bitcoin community has
responded to these attacks with ad hoc changes to its net-
working stack for improved anonymity [1].
Analysis of diffusion. A number of researchers have stud-
ied source detection on diffusion processes on graphs. These
results show that for various classes of graphs and adversar-
ial models, reliable deanonymization is possible [45, 46, 19,
48, 30, 39]. However, there has been a relative lack of theo-
retical results in the analysis of diffusion under a spy-based
adversary like ours. Many of the results in this space pro-
pose effective heuristics that achieve high recall in practice
[36, 51, 50]. These papers suggest that by using central-
ity information, adversaries may be able to launch stronger
attacks than prior practical network attacks [7, 8].
Anonymous broadcasting. The topic of anonymous broad-
casting has been studied for decades. The best-known ex-
ample is dining cryptographer networks (DC nets), which
enable a user to broadcast a message anonymously with
information-theoretic guarantees [12]. DC nets are communication-
intensive, which has prevented them from scaling beyond a
few thousand nodes [49, 14, 23], and they are not well-suited
to distributed systems like cryptocurrencies.
Another relevant topic is adaptive diffusion (AD) [18],
which was recently proposed as an anonymous spreading
protocol for broadcasting content over fixed graphs. AD
shares some properties with Dandelion, such as symmetry-
breaking. However, AD was designed for social networks,
which do not require all nodes to receive every message. In-
deed, AD can ‘get stuck’ on real graphs, meaning that some
messages do not reach the entire network [18]. This prop-
erty is unacceptable in cryptocurrencies: all nodes should
receive all messages for fairness and consistency purposes.
Finally, the core idea of dandelion spreading—i.e., passing
content through a set of proxies—has been used in numerous
anonymity systems, mainly for point-to-point communica-
tion [17, 41]. However, existing systems have not connected
dandelion spreading to any fundamental anonymity guaran-
tees, and they typically assume a complete graph topology
[17]. In contrast, we identify topologies over which dande-
lion spreading actually provides strong guarantees (i.e., not
complete graphs). More fundamentally, our problem is fo-
cused on broadcasting over a network, which has different
requirements and models than point-to-point messaging.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we redesign the Bitcoin P2P stack to pro-
vide anonymity against distributed adversaries (e.g., bot-
nets) who wish to link users to their transactions. We present
the Dandelion networking policy, which achieves nearly-
optimal anonymity guarantees with a simple, distributed im-
plementation. Intuitively, Dandelion achieves these guar-
antees by mixing messages from different users on a graph
that remains hidden from the adversary.
A few topics of interest during deployment are as fol-
lows: first, we have analyzed honest-but-curious adversarial
nodes. In practice, botnet nodes may run malicious code
that breaks protocol. In this case, anonymity can be nega-
tively affected by nodes forwarding content inappropriately
or misbehaving during graph construction. Hardening our
protocols against such intrusions is critical. For example,
noninteractive graph construction protocols offer some ro-
bustness by reducing opportunities for the adversary to lie in
order to generate an advantageous anonymity graph. Alter-
natively, a system could use cryptographic proofs to ensure
that nodes follow the graph construction protocol. Explor-
ing these options is beyond the scope of this paper.
Second, we have paid less attention to the issue of message
latency by assuming the two-phase architecture of dandelion
spreading. As stated in Sec. 5, it is unclear if such an ar-
chitecture is inherently optimal. Understanding the tradeoff
between anonymity and latency is of fundamental interest.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOFS
A.1 Section 3: Anonymity Metric Properties
A.1.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Consider any realization of the network, in which the mes-
sages X are mapped to the servers VH according to mapping
rule M. Then from the definition of precision and recall at
any node v (Equations (2), (3)), we have
DM(v) =
1{M(Xv) = v}∑
w∈VH 1{M(Xw) = v}
≤ 1{M(Xv) = v} = RM(v). (11)
Hence it follows that the macro-averaged precision DM is at
most the macro-averaged recall RM, implying DM ≤ RM.
To prove inequality (b), let VM = {v ∈ VH : M(Xv) = v}
denote the set of servers whose corresponding messages are
correctly mapped by M. Further, for each such node v ∈ VM,
let Iv = {x ∈ X : M(x) = v, x 6= Xv} denote all the messages
(other than v’s own message Xv) that are mapped to v.
Then, by definition we have RM = |VM|/n˜ and
n˜DM =
∑
v∈VH
DM(v) =
∑
v∈VM
1
|Iv|+ 1
≥ |VM|
2∑
v∈VM(|Iv|+ 1)
≥ |VM|
2
n˜
= n˜R2M (12)
where Equation (12) follows from the arithmetic-mean harmonic-
mean (A.M-H.M) inequality and
∑
v∈VM(|Iv|+1) ≤ n˜. Hence
we have RM ≤
√
DM, which upon taking expectation and us-
ing Jensen’s inequality, yields RM ≤
√
DM.
A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Recall that for honest server v, the tuple (x, u, Tu(x)) is
contained in Sv if v forwards message x to adversarial node
u at time Tu(x). Let us now define a related quantity S¯v to
denote the set of messages x ∈ X forwarded by v to some
adversary such that x was not received by any adversarial
node previously. This quantity S¯v is useful in analyses in-
volving the first-spy estimator. S¯ denotes the vector of all
S¯v’s.
Lemma 1. If v ∈ VH is a honest server node in a network
with a fraction p of adversaries, then the recall of the first-
spy estimator is RFS(v) = P(Xv ∈ S¯v) ≥ p.
Proof. Let U ∈ Γ(v) denote the node to which v first
sends its message Xv. Then,
P(U ∈ VA) =
∑
u∈V,u6=v
P(U = u)P(U ∈ VA|U = u)
=
∑
u∈V,u6=v
1
n− 1P(U ∈ VA|U = u) =
np
n− 1 ≥ p, (13)
due to uniform distribution among the remaining nodes V \{v}.
Therefore we have,
P(Xv ∈ S¯v) ≥ P(U ∈ VA) ≥ p. (14)
Thus v’s message is contained in S¯v with probability at least
p. The case where v simultaneously broadcasts Xv to multi-
ple nodes can also be similarly bounded as above, and hence
the lemma follows.
To show (7), note that ROPT ≥ RFS(v) ≥ p, by Lemma
1. Next, we show that the first-spy estimator also has a
precision of at least p2 regardless of the topology or spread-
ing scheme. Consider a random realization S¯, in which the
adversaries observe a set of first-received messages Sv ⊆ X
from each node v ∈ V . Now, supposing in these observations
there exists a subset of t server nodes {v1, v2, . . . , vt} whose
own messages are included in the respective forwarded sets,
i.e., Xvi ∈ S¯vi∀i = 1, 2, . . . , t. The macro-averaged precision
in this case is
DFS =
1
n˜
t∑
i=1
1
|S¯vi |
≥ t
2
n˜
∑n˜
i=1 |S¯vi |
≥ t
2
n˜2
, (15)
where the first inequality above is due to the arithmetic-
mean harmonic-mean (A.M-H.M) inequality, and the second
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inequality is because the total number of messages is at most
n˜. Equation (15) in turn implies that
E[DFS|T = t] ≥ t
2
n˜2
. (16)
The overall expected detection precision can then be bounded
as
DFS = E[DFS] =
n˜∑
t=0
P(T = t)E[DFS|T = t]
≥
n˜∑
t=0
P(T = t) t
2
n˜2
=
E[T 2]
n˜2
≥ E[T ]
2
n˜2
=
E[
∑
v∈VH 1Xv∈S¯v ]
2
n˜2
≥ (pn˜)
2
n˜2
= p2, (17)
where the inequality in Equation (17) follows from Lemma 1.
Finally by definition we have DOPT ≥ DFS and hence the
theorem follows.
A.1.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Let us first prove that the optimal mapping must be a
matching. Supposing otherwise, consider a mapping M ∈M
that is not a matching. Then there exists a server v that
is mapped to the most number of messages {x1, x2, . . . , xk}
(k > 1) in M. This also implies there exists another node
u ∈ VH such that no message is mapped to u. Now, the
expected precision at server v is given by
E[DM(v)|O] =
∑k
i=1 P(Xv = xi|O)
k
≤ max
i∈{1,...,k}
P(Xv = xi|O). (18)
On the other hand, the expected precision at u is zero. Now,
consider an alternative mapping M′ ∈ M in which all mes-
sages x ∈ X are mapped to servers exactly as in M except for
the message xi∗ where i
∗ = argmini∈{1,...,k}P(Xv = xi|O)
which is mapped to server u. In this case, the expected
precision at v becomes
E[DM′(v)|O] =
∑k
i=1,i 6=i∗ P(Xv = xi|O)
k − 1
≥ E[DM(v)|O], (19)
while the expected precision at u is
E[DM′(u)|O] = P(Xu = xi∗ |O) ≥ 0. (20)
As such the total expected precision at servers u and v is
E[DM′(v) +DM′(u)|O] ≥ E[DM(v) +DM(u)|O]
⇒ E[DM′ |O] ≥ E[DM|O]. (21)
Thus we have constructed a new mapping M′ whose expected
precision is at least as much as M and in which the maxi-
mum number of messages mapped to any server is smaller
by 1.2 Continuing this process, we conclude that for any
mapping M ∈ M there exists another matching mapping M′
such that E[DM′ |O] ≥ E[DM|O]. Thus the optimizing map-
ping is achieved by a matching.
Now, letM∗ denote the set of all matchings in the bipar-
tite graph (VH ,X ). By the first part of the theorem above,
2In case of ties, we repeat the above process to each of the
servers until the maximum server degree reduces by one.
we can restrict our search to M∗ for finding the optimal
mapping. As such,
E[DOPT|O] = max
M∈M∗
E[DM|O]
= max
M∈M∗
∑
(v,x)∈M
P(Xv = x|O), (22)
implying that the optimum is achieved by a maximum weight
matching.
A.1.4 Proof of Corollary 1
Let M ∈ M be any mapping under observations O =
(S,Γ). Consider a server v and let {x1, x2, . . . , xk} be the
set of messages that are mapped to v in M. Then,
E[DM(v)|O] ≤
∑k
i=1 P(Xv = xi|O)
k
≤ max
i∈{1,...,k}
P(Xv = xi|O)
≤ max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|O). (23)
Since the above Equation (23) holds for any mapping M, it
must hold for the optimal mapping as well.
A.1.5 Proof of Theorem 4
We want to prove that the optimal mapping must map
each message x ∈ X to a server v that maximizes P(Xv =
x|O). Supposing otherwise, let us consider a mapping M ∈
M where there exists a server w that is mapped to a set
of messages {x1, x2, . . . , xk} (k ≥ 1), where w.l.o.g. w /∈
arg maxv∈VH P(Xv = x1|O). The expected recall at server
w is given by
E[RB(w)|O] =
k∑
i=1
P(Xw = xi|O).
Further, consider another node u ∈ VH such that
u ∈ arg maxv∈VH P(Xv = x1|O). Suppose it is mapped to
a different set of messages {y1, . . . , yj}. The expected recall
for node u is
E[RB(u)|O] =
j∑
i=1
P(Xu = yi|O).
Now, consider an alternative mapping M′ ∈ M in which all
messages x ∈ X are mapped to servers exactly as in M except
for the message x1, which is mapped to server u. In this case,
the expected recall at w becomes
E[RM′(w)|O] =
k∑
i=2
P(Xw = xi|O)
while the expected recall at u is
E[RM′(u)|O] = E[RM(u)|O] + P(Xu = x1|O). (24)
As such the total expected precision at servers u and v is
E[DM′(w) +DM′(u)|O] ≥ E[DM(w) +DM(u)|O]
⇒ E[DM′ |O] ≥ E[DM|O]. (25)
Thus we have constructed a new mapping M′ whose expected
precision is at least as much as M and in which the number
of messages mapped to servers with sub-maximal likelihood
is reduced by one. Continuing this process, we conclude
that for any mapping M ∈ M there exists another mapping
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M′ such that each message x is mapped to a server v∗ ∈
arg maxv∈VH P(Xv = x|O).
A.2 Section 4: Baseline Algorithms
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the broadcasting experiment on a random real-
ization G of the network topology. In the static case this
topology is completely known to the adversary. As defined
in Section A.1.2, for any honest server v ∈ VH , let S¯v de-
note the set of transactions x ∈ X such that x is directly
forwarded by v to some adversary and x has not been re-
ceived by any adversary previously. By our assumption on
flooding, this means a server v’s message is contained in S¯u
if and only if
(i) u is reachable from v,
(ii) u has an out-going edge to an adversary and
(iii) no other node u′ ∈ VH that satisfies the previous two
conditions is strictly closer to v than u.
Thus by looking at the graph G, the adversary can con-
struct a bipartite graph B(VH , VH) in which there is edge
(u, v) ∈ VH × VH if and only if Xv will be contained in S¯u.
Further for each u ∈ VH , let Wu = {v ∈ VH : (u, v) ∈
B, @ u′ 6= u s.t. (u′, v) ∈ B} denote the set of server nodes
whose messages reach only the message set S¯u. Note that for
servers v ∈ VH that have an out-going edge to an adversary,
we must have v ∈Wv.
Now, once the messages have been broadcast in G, con-
sider the following mapping strategy M for the adversary.
First, for each set S¯v we compute a subset S¯
′
v = {x ∈ S¯v :
x /∈ S¯u∀u 6= v}. Such a set S¯′v corresponds to the messages
that were delivered to the adversaries only by server v and
no other server. Thus, the messages in S¯′v must precisely
belong to the servers in Wv. As such, the adversary’s map-
ping strategy can be: (i) for each v ∈ VH pick a random
matching mapping between S¯′v and Wv and (ii) assign any
remaining messages randomly to the remaining server nodes.
Let Ev denote the event that v has an out-going edge to an
adversary. The payoff can then be bounded as
E[n˜DM|G] ≥ E
 ∑
v∈VH :
|Wv|≥1
∑
u∈Wv
1{M(Xu) = u}
∣∣∣∣G

=
∑
v∈VH :
|Wv|≥1
∑
u∈Wv
E[1{M(Xu) = u}|G]
=
∑
v∈VH :
|Wv|≥1
∑
u∈Wv
1
|Wv| =
∑
v∈VH
1{|Wv| ≥ 1}, (26)
where Equation (26) follows because in a random matching
any message in S′v is likely to be assigned to its true server
in Wv with probability 1/|Wv|. Hence the total average
precision is bounded by
n˜DM ≥ E
 ∑
v∈VH
1{|Wv| ≥ 1}
 (27)
≥
∑
v∈VH
P(Ev) = n˜(1− (1− p)d) (28)
and we have the proposition.
v
u
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Figure 10: Comparison of the number of adversarial nodes
receiving a message in 2 rounds following first reception
when the source is (i) directly connected to an adversary
(left) and (ii) away from the adversary (right). The propa-
gation of the message is shown in red; darkened nodes are
adversarial.
A.2.2 Proof Sketch of Proposition 2
Before we begin the proof, first notice that in the dynamic
setting the adversaries are directly connected to at most dpn
(i.e., roughly a fraction p) honest servers, while the rest of
the server locations are unknown to the adversary. Since
the hidden servers can only be trivially de-anonymized, in
order to obtain our claimed average precision of O(p) each of
the servers visible to the adversary must be de-anonymized
with a high precision close to 1. Indeed, in the following we
describe a simple mapping scheme M that achieves this high
precision.
For a server v ∈ VH , let Ev denote the event that at least
one of v’s out-going edges is connected to an adversary. Con-
sider then, the spreading of v’s message Xv in the graph
under event Ev. Since G is a random d-regular graph, us-
ing the result in [?], there is almost surely a regular tree of
depth at least 1
2
logd−1 n rooted at v. For simplicity, let us
consider d = 4 in which case there is a tree of depth at least
1
4
logn rooted at v almost surely. Thus v’s message prop-
agates along this tree, reaching two nodes (at least one of
which is an adversary, due to Ev) in the first round and sub-
sequently reaching 2i new nodes in the i-th round for each
i < 1
4
logn. Since a fraction p of the nodes are adversarial,
this implies in the i-th round we expect roughly p2i adver-
sarial nodes to receive Xv. On the other hand, if some other
server u upstream of v had started broadcasting its message
Xu, then more adversarial nodes would have received Xu
in the i-th round following reception by the first adversarial
node (see Figure 10).
The above observation then, naturally motivates a map-
ping M as described in Algorithm 3. In this strategy, the ad-
versary simply counts the number of adversarial nodes that
received a particular message x ∈ X at a time 1
4
logn − 1
rounds after the message was first received by some adver-
sarial node a. If this number is small (< 2pn1/4) then we
conclude the source of x to be the server v that sent the
message to the first adversary. Otherwise the message is
randomly assigned to an unassigned server at the end.
The algorithm works because if v were truly the source of
x, then in the ( 1
4
logn− 1)-th round following reception by
a, the number of adversarial nodes to receive x is less than
2pn1/4 with a probability at least 1− 2− log(4/e)pn1/4 by the
Chernoff bound. On the other hand if v were not the true
source of x, then x was initially broadcast at a time at least
2 rounds before a received it. This implies at least 2pn1/4
adversarial nodes receive the message at a time 1
4
logn − 1
16
Algorithm 3: Mapping algorithm under flooding for a
dynamic 4-regular graph.
Input: Time-stamp Tv(x) and sender Sv(x) for each
message x ∈ X received by adversary v for all
v ∈ VA.
Output: Mapping M from X to VH
I ← VH , J ← X
for each x ∈ X do
ainit ← arg minv∈VA Tv(x)
Tinit ← Tainit(x)
vinit ← Sainit(x)
η ← |{v ∈ VA : Tv(x) = Tinit + 14 logn− 1}|
if η < 2pn1/4 then
M(x)← vinit
I ← I\{vinit}
J ← J\{x}
end
end
Randomly assign messages in J to servers in I
return M
rounds following reception by a. Thus the total probability
of error can be bounded by the union bound, to yield that
whenever a server v’s out-going edges are connected to at
least one adversarial node, Xv is mapped to v with precision
1 with high probability. Such an event Ev happens with a
probability at least p to conclude the Theorem.
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3
For any message Xu, let Πu = (Π1,u,Π2,u, . . . ,ΠLu,u) be
the path taken by a message from its source u (= Π1,u) until
it reaches an adversarial node ΠLu,u for the first time (Lu
denotes the length of the path). Further for any two nodes
v, u ∈ VH , let Eu,v denote the event that u’s message Xu
reaches the adversary through server v, i.e., Π1,u = u,Π2,u /∈
VA,Π3,u /∈ VA, . . . ,Πk−2,u /∈ VA,Πk−1,u = v and Πk,u ∈ VA.
Then by counting over paths of all possible lengths, we can
evaluate probability of Eu,u as
P(Eu,u) =
∑
l≥2
P(Lk = l, Eu,u)
=
(np
n
)
+
∑
l≥3
(
n˜
n
)l−3(
1
n
)(np
n
)
= p+
1
n
. (29)
Similarly, for u ∈ VH , u 6= v,
P(Eu,v) =
∑
l≥3
(
n˜
n
)l−3(
1
n
)(np
n
)
=
1
n
. (30)
Further, since the messages are all forwarded independently
the set of events {Ev,u : v ∈ VH} are mutually independent
for each server u ∈ VH . Hence the expected cost incurred at
a server under the first-spy estimator can be written as
DFS(v) =
(
p+
1
n
)
E
[
1
1 + Zv
]
=
(
p+
1
n
)
1
n˜ 1
n
(
1−
(
1− 1
n
)n˜)
, (31)
where Zv =
∑
u∈VH ,u 6=v 1{Eu,v} is the number of messages,
other than Xv, that reach the adversary through v and
Zv ∼ Binom
(
n˜− 1, 1
n
)
because of independence of messages
and Equation (30). The last equation above can be further
simplified to yield the bound
DFS(v) ≥ p
1− p (1− e
p−1), (32)
which when averaged over all honest nodes v ∈ VH gives us
the desired result.
A.3 Section 5: Main Result - Dandelion
A.3.1 Proof of Theorem 5
We first show that the first-spy estimator is recall-optimal
for dandelion spreading, then that the first-spy estimator has
an expected recall of p.
To show the first step, i.e., ROPT = RFS, Theorem 4 im-
plies that we must show that for every message x, its exit
node z (i.e., the node implicated by the first-spy estima-
tor) maximizes P(Xv = x|O). For any message Xu, let
Πu = (Π1,u,Π2,u, . . . ,ΠLu,u) be the path taken by a mes-
sage from its source u (= Π1,u) until it reaches an adversarial
node ΠLu,u for the first time (Lu denotes the length of the
path). From the adversary’s observation S, ΠLu−1,u and
ΠLu,u are fixed as the exit node z and the first spy for Xu,
respectively. Due to the specification of dandelion spreading
(Algorithm 1), the likelihood of this path, L(Πu), is L(Πu) =∏Lu−1
i=1
1
deg(Πi,u)
, where deg(v) denotes the out-degree of v.
Assuming a uniform prior over candidate sources, we have
P(Xv = x|O) ∝ L(Πv). Since each node is assumed to have
an out-degree of at least 1, this likelihood is maximized by
taking the shortest path possible. That is, the maximum-
likelihood path over all paths originating at honest candi-
date sources gives z ∈ arg maxv∈VH P(Xv = x|O). Hence
the first-spy estimator is also a maximum-recall estimator.
Now we analyze the recall of the first-spy estimator. Let
Pv denote the event that v’s parent (i.e., the next node in
the line) is adversarial. Then the expected recall is
ROPT = E[RFS|S, G] = 1
n˜
E
 ∑
v∈VH
1{Pv}

⇒ ROPT = 1
n˜
∑
v∈VH
P(Pv) = 1
n˜
∑
v∈VH
(
n− 1
n
np
n− 1
)
= p.
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 4
For any node v, let Wv = {u ∈ VH : Xu ∈ Sv} denote the
ward under node v and let W denote the set of all wards.
Note that in the tree topology, the wards Wv can be com-
pletely determined from knowledge of the graph G. Also, let
I(v) denote the node u ∈ VH such that Xv ∈ Su. Then, the
expected cost at a node v under observations O = (S, G) by
the adversary can be written as
E[DM(v)|S, G] = E[DM(v)|S, G,W] = 1|WI(v)| . (33)
This follows because the matching estimator MAT assigns the
messages in Sv to the nodes in Wv as a random matching,
and hence the probability of a node receiving the correct
message is 1/|Wv|. Summing Equation (33) over all honest
nodes, we have
E[DMAT|S, G] =
∑
v∈VH
1
|WI(v)| = |W |, (34)
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where |W | = |{v : Wv 6= ∅}| denotes the number of non-
empty wards, and ∅ denotes the null set. Now, let Pv de-
note the event that v’s parent is adversarial. Since a ward
under a node v is non-empty iff v’s parent is adversarial,
Equation (34) above becomes
E[DMAT|S, G] = 1
n˜
E
 ∑
v∈VH
1{Pv}
 (35)
⇒ DMAT = 1
n˜
∑
v∈VH
P(Pv) = 1
n˜
∑
v∈VH
(
n− 1
n
np
n− 1
)
= p.
A.3.3 Proof of Proposition 5
First note that since the tree is dynamic, the adversary’s
observations consists of O = (S,Γ(VA)), i.e., the transaction
logs and the local neighborhood of adversarial nodes. Now
for any honest node v ∈ VH , let Ev denote the event that (i)
v occurs at a position in G which is a leaf of the tree and
(ii) v’s parent is an adversary. Similarly let Iv denote the
event that v ∈ VH occurs at the interior of the tree. We first
show that whenever Ev happens, v is detected with certainty
under the first-spy estimator, i.e.,
E[DFS(v)|S,Γ(VA), Ev] = 1. (36)
This is because DFS(v) =
∑
x∈Sv 1{Xv=x}
|Sv| in the first-spy
estimator and Sv = {Xv} whenever Ev happens. As such,
E[DFS(v)|S,Γ(VA), Ev] = E[1{Xv = Xv}|S,Γ(VA), Ev] = 1
⇒ E[DFS(v)|Ev] = 1. (37)
Hence the expected payoff becomes
DFS(v) = P(Ev)E[DFS(v)|Ev] + P(Iv)E[DFS(v)|Iv] (38)
≥ P(Ev)E[DFS(v)|Ev] = 1
2
np
(n− 1) ≥
p
2
, (39)
since at least half of the nodes are leaves in a perfect d-ary
tree. Summing over all honest nodes gives the result.
A.3.4 Proof of Theorem 6
As in the case of dynamic trees, the adversary’s observa-
tions consists of O = (S,Γ(VA)) in the dynamic line as well.
The proof works by evaluating the cost incurred under vari-
ous possibilities for the local neighborhood structure around
a node in the network. For any honest server node v ∈ VH ,
let Ev(i, j) denote the event that (i) i nodes preceding v are
honest nodes, the (i + 1)-th node preceding v is adversar-
ial and (ii) j nodes succeeding v are honest nodes and the
(j + 1)-th node following v is adversarial. Also for ease of
notation let Iv denote the event ∪i>0,j>0Ev(i, j). Then the
following lemmas hold true.
Lemma 2. On a line-graph, for any i, j > 0, we have
E[max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Ev(i, 0))|Ev(i, 0)] ≤ 1
i+ 1
E[max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Ev(0, j))|Ev(0, j)] ≤ 1
j + 1
E[max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Ev(0, 0))|Ev(0, 0)] ≤ 1
E[max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Iv)|Iv] ≤ 1
n(1− 3p) . (40)
Proof. Consider a realization G of the network topology
such that our desired event Ev(i, 0) happens. In such a graph
G, the node succeeding v is an adversarial node and the i
nodes preceding v are honest. Let us denote this set of i+ 1
nodes – comprising of the i nodes preceding v and v itself – as
Wv (i.e., the ward of v). Now, if the messages assigned to the
nodes outside of Wv is denoted by X(VH\Wv), then for any
x ∈ Sv we have P(Xv = x|G,S,Γ(VA), Ev(i, 0), X(VH\Wv)
=
P(Xv = x,S, X(VH\Wv)|G,Γ(VA), Ev(i, 0))∑
x∈Sv P(Xv = x,S, X(VH\Wv)|G,Γ(VA), Ev(i, 0))
=
P(Xv = x,X(VH\Wv)|G,Γ(VA), Ev(i, 0))∑
x∈Sv P(Xv = x,X(VH\Wv)|G,Γ(VA), Ev(i, 0))
=
1
i+ 1
, (41)
by using the fact that the allocation of messages X is in-
dependent of the graph structure (G,Γ(VA), Ev(i, 0)) and
P(S|Xv = x,X(VH\Wv), G,Γ(VA), Ev(i, 0)) = 1 on a line-
graph. Now, taking expectation on both sides of Equa-
tion (41) we get
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Ev(i, 0)) = 1
i+ 1
∀x ∈ Sv
⇒ max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Ev(i, 0)) = 1
i+ 1
or
E[max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Ev(i, 0))|Ev(i, 0)] = 1
i+ 1
. (42)
By a similar argument as above, we can also show that
E[max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Ev(0, j))|Ev(0, j)] = 1
j + 1
,
E[max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Ev(0, 0))|Ev(0, 0)] = 1. (43)
Finally let us consider the case where v is an interior node,
i.e., event Iv happens. As before, for a head-node u (an
honest node whose successor is an adversarial node) let Wu
denote the ward containing u. Notice that under observa-
tions S,Γ(VA) the adversaries know (i) the head and tail
nodes of each ward (from Γ(VA)) and (ii) the size of each
ward (|Wu| = |Su|). Therefore if a message x is such that
x ∈ Su for some u, then
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Iv) = P(Xv = x, v ∈Wu|S,Γ(VA), Iv)
= P(v ∈Wu|S,Γ(VA), Iv)P(Xv = x|v ∈Wu,S,Γ(VA), Iv)
=
|Wu| − 2
|I|
1
|Wu| ≤
1
|I| ≤
1
n(1− 3p) , (44)
where I denotes the set of all interior nodes and |I| ≥ n(1−
3p) since each adversary is a neighbor to at most 2 honest
server nodes. Hence we have
E[max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Iv)|Iv] ≤ 1
n(1− 3p) , (45)
concluding the proof.
Lemma 3. On a line-graph, for i, j > 0 we have
P(Ev(i, 0)) ≤
(
p+
1
n
)2(
1− p+ 2
n
)i
(46)
P(Ev(0, j)) ≤
(
p+
1
n
)2(
1− p+ 2
n
)j
(47)
P(Ev(0, 0)) ≤ (p+ 1/n)2 (48)
P(Iv) ≤ (1− p)2. (49)
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Proof. First let us consider the event Ev(i, 0) in which
node v has an adversarial successor, i honest predecessor
nodes and an adversarial i+1-th predecessor. Let Yv denote
the position of node v in the line graph. Then
P(Ev(i, 0)) =
n∑
j=i+1
P(Yv = j)P(Ev(i, 0)|Yv = j), (50)
since v needs to be at a position on the line graph where at
least i+ 1 predecessors are feasible. Now, for i+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
by a simple counting argument we have P(Ev(i, 0)|Yv = j) =(
np
n− 1
)(
np− 1
n− 2
)(
n˜− 1
n− 3
)(
n˜− 2
n− 4
)
. . .
(
n˜− i
n− i− 2
)
≤
(
p+
1
n
)2(
1− p+ 2
n
)i
Combining the above inequality with Equation (50) we con-
clude that
P(Ev(i, 0)) ≤
(
p+
1
n
)2(
1− p+ 2
n
)i
(51)
for i > 0. By essentially a similar counting as above, we
can also obtain the remaining Equations (47), (48) and (49)
from the Lemma.
Lemma 4. If E1, E2, . . . , Ek is a set of mutually exclusive
and exhaustive events, and v ∈ VH is any honest server
node, then
DOPT(v) ≤
k∑
i=1
P(Ei)E[max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Ei)|Ei]. (52)
Proof. The proof is straightforward and follows from
Corollary 1. From Equation (8) we have
E[DOPT(v)|S,Γ(VA)] ≤ max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA))
= max
x∈X
k∑
i=1
P(Ei|S,Γ(VA))P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Ei)
≤
k∑
i=1
P(Ei|S,Γ(VA)) max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Ei). (53)
Taking expectation on both sides of the above equation, we
get DOPT(v) ≤ E[maxx∈X P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Ei)],
⇒ DOPT(v) ≤
k∑
i=1
P(Ei)E[max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Ei)|Ei],
and thus proving the Lemma.
To complete the proof of the Theorem, let use Lemma 4
with Ev(i, 0), Ev(0, j), Ev(0, 0) and Ev for i, j > 0 as the set
of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events. Then the ex-
pected payoff at v can be bounded as DOPT(v) ≤∑
i>0
P(Ev(i, 0))E[max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Ev(i, 0))|Ev(i, 0)]
+
∑
j>0
P(Ev(0, j))E[max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Ev(0, j))|Ev(0, j)]
+P(Ev(0, 0))E[max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Ev(0, 0))|Ev(0, 0)]
+P(Iv)E[max
x∈X
P(Xv = x|S,Γ(VA), Iv)|Iv],
(54)
where the values of the individual expectation and probabil-
ity terms in the above Equation (54) have been computed in
Lemmas 2 and 3 respectively. Using those bounds, we get
DOPT(v) ≤
∑
i>0
(
p+
1
n
)2(
1− p+ 2
n
)i
1
i+ 1
+
∑
j>0
(
p+
1
n
)2(
1− p+ 2
n
)j
1
i+ 1
+ (p+ 1/n)2 + (1− p)2 1
n(1− 3p)
≤ 2(p+
1
n
)2
(1− p+ 2
n
)
log
(
1
p− 2
n
)
+
(1− p)2
n(1− 3p)
≤ 2p
2
1− p log
(
2
p
)
+O
(
1
n
)
. (55)
Finally averaging the expected payoff DOPT(v) over each of
the n˜ honest server nodes v ∈ VH , we get the desired result.
A.4 Section 6: Systems Issues
A.4.1 Proof of Proposition 6
We map the problem of constructing a line (i.e., a 2-
regular digraph) to one of assigning balls to bins. Suppose
each ball represents an outgoing connection, and each bin
represents a server who may accept that outgoing connec-
tion. There are n balls and n bins; for the sake of simplicity,
we assume that a server can establish a connection to itself,
so all n bins are available to each ball. Then the maxi-
mum degree dm of the degree distribution is linearly related
to the maximum number of balls in any bin hm. That is,
dm = 1+hm. When k = 1, each ball is assigned to a bin uni-
formly. The quantity hm has been studied extensively in this
case, and the result for k = 1 in Proposition 6 is well-known
[24]. When k > 1, Algorithm 2 exploits the ‘power of two
choices’ paradigm. Power of two choices states that by pick-
ing the minimum-degree node among two choices, the maxi-
mum in-degree hm =
log logn
log 2
(1+o(1))+Θ(1) with high prob-
ability [4]. This is an exponential reduction in maximum
degree compared to when k = 1. More generally, for arbi-
trary k > 1, the maximum degree is log logn
log k
(1+o(1))+Θ(1).
This result is due to Azar et al. [4] and is well-studied in
subsequent literature [33].
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